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DISSENTING OPINION  
Count Three of the Indictment 
 
This dissenting opinion is filed pursuant to reservations made at the time of the 
rendition of the final judgment by Military Tribunal VI in this case. Under Count Three of the 
indictment, all defendants are charged with having committed War Crimes and Crimes 
Against Humanity as defined in Article II of Control Council Law No. 10. It is alleged in the 
indictment that the defendants participated in the enslavement and deportation to slave labor 
on a gigantic scale of members of the civilian population of countries and territories under the 
belligerent occupation of, or otherwise controlled by Germany; that the defendants 
participated in the enslavement of concentration camp inmates, including German nationals; 
that the defendants participated in the use of prisoners of war in war operations and work 
having a direct relation to war operations, including the manufacture and transportation or war 
material and equipment; and, that the defendants participated in the mis-treatment, 
terrorization, torture, and murder of enslaved persons. It is alleged that all defendants 
committed War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity as enumerated, in that they were 
principals in, accessories to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, were connected with 
plans and enterprises involving, and were members of organizations or groups including 
 Farben, which were connected with the commission of said crimes. There are general 
allegations that the defendants acted through the corporate instrumentality, I.G. 
Farbenindustrie, A.G. in the commission of said crimes. 
The Tribunal convicted the defendant Krauch, ter Meer, Ambros, Buetefisch and 
Duerrfeld under this count principally for initiative shown in the procurement of slave labor 
for the construction of Farben's Buna plant at Auschwitz. The remaining defendants were all 
acquitted of the charges under Count Three. Included in the group of acquitted defendants 
were fifteen members of the Vorstand, or principal governing corporate board of Farben. The 
acquitted Vorstand members included: Schmitz, von Schnitzler, Buergin, Haeflinger, Ilgner, 
Jaehne, Oster, Gajewski, Hoerlein, von Knieriem, Schneider, Kuehne, Lautenschlseger, Mann 
and Wurster. The majority opinion concedes, and, in fact, it is not seriously converted in this 
case, that slave labor, i.e., compulsory foreign workers, concentration camp inmates and 
prisoners of war were employed and utilized on a wide scale throughout numerous plants of 
the vast Farben organization and that such utilization was known by the defendants. The 
majority reached the conclusion that, except in the case of Auschwitz where initiative 
constituting and willing cooperation by Farben with the slave labor program was held to have 
been proved, no criminal responsibility resulted for participation in the utilization of slave 
labor. Basically, the majority opinion under Count Three concluded that, in order to meet 
fixed production quotas set by the Reich, "Farben yielded to the pressure of the Reich labor 
office and utilized involuntary foreign workers in many its plants." The majority assert that 
"The utilization of forced labor, unless done under such circumstances as to relieve the 
employer of responsibility, constitutes a violation of that part of Article II of Control Council 
Law No. 10, which recognizes as war crimes and crimes against humanity the enslavement, 
deportation, or imprisonment of the civilian population of other countries." But the majority 
fully accepts the defense contention that the utilization of slave labor by Farben (except in the 
case of Auschwitz) was the result of the compulsory production quotas and other obligatory 
governmental decrees and regulations directing the use of slave labor. The asserted defense of 
"necessary" is held to have been sustained because of the reign of terror within the Reich and 
because of possible dire consequences to the defendants had they pursued any other policy 
than that of compliance with the slave labor system of the Third Reich. 
I concur in the conviction of the five defendants found guilty by the Tribunal, but I am 
 of the opinion that the criminal responsibility goes much further than merely embracing the 
five defendants most immediately connected with the construction of Farben's Auschwitz 
plant. In my view all the members of the Farben Vorstand should be held guilty under Count 
Three of the indictment not only for the participation by Farben in the crime of enslavement at 
Auschwitz, but also for Farben's widespread participation and willing cooperation with the 
slave labor system in the other Farben plants where utilization of forced labor in violation of 
the well-settled principles of internation[al] law recognized in Control Council Law No. 10 has 
been so conclusively shown. I disagree with the conclusion that the defense of necessity is 
applicable to the facts proved in this case. 
While it is true that there were numerous governmental decrees under which complete 
control of the manpower supply was assumed by the Reich Government, existence of such 
controls does not, in my opinion, establish the defense of necessity even under the conditions 
which existed in Nazi Germany. Recognition of such a defense is, in my view, utterly 
inconsistent with the provisions of Control Council Law No. 10 which indicate quite clearly 
that Governmental compulsion is merely a matter to be considered in mitigation and does not 
establish a defense to the facts of guilt. Thus Section 4(b) of Article II of Control Council Law 
No. 10 provides: 
"The fact that any person acted pursuant to the order of his Government or a superior 
does not free him from responsibility for a crime, but may be considered in 
mitigation."  
Under the evidence it is clear that the defendants in utilizing slave labor which is 
conceded to be a war crime (in the case of non German nationals) and a crime against 
humanity, did not, as they assert, in fact, act exclusively because of the compulsion and 
coercion of the existing Governmental regulations and policies. The record does not establish 
by any substantial credible proof that any of the defendants were actually opposed to the 
Governmental solutions of the manpower problems reflected in these regulations. On the 
contrary, the record shows that Farben willingly cooperated and gladly utilized each new 
source of manpower as it developed. Disregard of basic human rights did not deter these 
defendants. At times they expressed concern over the inefficiency of compulsory labor but they 
willingly cooperated in the tyrannical system. Far from establishing that the defendants acted 
under "necessity" or "coercion" in this regard, I conclude from the record that Farben accepted 
 and frequently sought the forced workers, including compulsory foreign workers, concentration 
camp inmates and prisoners of war for armament work because there was no other solution to 
the manpower needs. Farben and these defendants wanted to meet production quotas in aid of 
the German war effort. In fact, the production quotas of Farben were largely fixed by Farben 
itself because Farben was completely integrated with the entire German program of war 
production. Farben's planners, led by defendant Krauch, geared Farben's potentialities to actual 
war needs. It is totally irrevelant [irrelevant] that the defendants might have preferred German 
workers. That they would have preferred not to commit a crime is no defense to its 
commission. The important fact is that Farben's Vorstand willingly cooperated in utilizing 
forced labor. They were not forced to do so. I cannot agree that there was an absence of moral 
choice. In utilizing slave labor within Farben the will of the actors coincided with the will of 
those controlling the Government and who had directed or ordered the doing of criminal acts. 
Under these circumstances the defense of necessity is certainly not admissible. 
I am convinced that persons in the positions of power and influence of these 
defendants might in numberless was have avoided the widespread participation in the slave 
labor utilization that was prevalent throughout the Farben organization. I cannot agree with the 
assertion that these defendants had no other choice than to comply with the mandates of the 
Hitler government. Had there been any real will to resist such comprehensive participation in 
the crime of enslavement, the defendants, possessing superior knowledge in their respective 
complicated technical fields, could no doubt have avoided such participation through a variety 
of devices of such imperceptible nature as to avoid the drastic results now portrayed in the 
posing of this defense. In reality, the defense is an after-thought, the  validity of which is 
belied by Farben's entire course of action. To assert that Hitler would have "welcomed the 
opportunity to make an example of a Farben leader" is, in my opinion, pure speculation and 
does not establish the defense of necessity on the facts here involved. 
The defense of necessity as accepted by the majority would, in my opinion, lead 
logically to the conclusion that Hitler alone was responsible for the major was crimes and 
crimes against humanity committed during the Nazi regime. If the defense of superior orders 
or coercion, as directed in the Chapter of the IMT, was not recognized in the case of the 
principal defendants tried by that Tribunal as applied to defendants who were subject to strict 
military discipline and subject to the most severe penalties for failure to carry out the criminal 
 plans decreed and evolved by Hitler, it become difficult to ascertain how any such defense 
can be admitted in the case of the present defendants. The IMT judgment embraces no 
doctrinal defense of necessity by governmental coercion. That decision, it seems to me, 
constitutes complete negation of any such theory. Nor do I consider the precedent established 
by Military Tribunal No. IV in the case of the United States v. Flickm [Flick] et al (Case No. 
5) persuasive in its recognition of the defense of "necessity". Such a doctrime [doctrine] 
constitutes, in my opinion, unbridled license for the commission of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity on the broadest possible scale through the simple expedience of the issuance 
of compulsory governmental regulations combined with the terrirism [terrorism] of the 
totalitarian or police state. The essence of a truly effective system of international penal law 
lies in its applicability to the acts of individuals who are nor privileged to disregard the over-
riding commands of international law ehen [even] they come in conflict with the contrary 
policies or directives of a State nor desiring to abide by the principles of inter- national law. 
For these reasons, I have no hesitancy in rejecting the conclusions reached in the Flick case 
on this asserted defense and cannot agree with the majority in this application to the facts here 
proven. 
In effect the majority opinion holds that, regardless of the extent of Farben's 
participation in the slave labor program, unless a particular defendant can be shown to have (a) 
exercised unusual initiative to bring about participation in the utilization of slave labor, no 
crime has been committed; or (b) unless a defendant in the course of the administration of his 
particular role in the slave labor program shows an initiative going beyond the requirements of 
the cruel regulations no crime has been committed. Under this construction Farben's complete 
integration into production planning, which virtually meant that it set its own production 
quotas, is not considered as "exercising initiative." Even the Flick case did not go so far. Action 
by a defendant in requesting the allocation of labor, knowing that compulsory foreign workers 
would be assigned, is considered by the majority to be done pursuant to and under "necessity" 
and does not result in criminal liability. Under the majority view a defendant who is a plant 
manager may willingly cooperate in the execution of cruel and inhumane regulations, such, for 
example, as putting into effect the required discriminations as to food and clothing in the case 
of the Eastern workers, or putting the miserable workers beyond barbed wair [wire] fences; this 
was no more than complying with the requirements of the Governmental regulations and, 
 according to the majority opinion, does not result in criminal responsibility. Similarly, where 
the evidence establishes that a defendant was responsible for the erection of a disciplinary camp 
at Farben plant or participated in the initiation of disciplinary measures against unruly 
compulsory workers- there is no criminal responsibility, the action is protected by the defense 
of "necessity" as the defendant did no more than that which the cruel and inhumane regulations 
required. Slave laborers might be reported to the Gestapo for punishment as this was required 
by the regulations and the defendant is not considered responsible. It cannot be successfully 
contended that this was done in the Farben plants employing slave labor. I cannot concur in 
such results. The coercion exercised by a totalitarian police state in the form of commands to its 
citizens should not be permitted to operate as a complete negation of the occpsing command of 
international penal law which has erected standards for the protection of basic human rights. 
Accessories and those taking a consenting part in the crime of enslavement should not be 
afforded such easy means or purging themselves of the fact of guilt. On the facts proven in this 
record, I am convinced that the defendants who were members of the Vorstand were 
accessories to and took a consenting part in the commission of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity as alleged in Count Three of the indictment. 
Conceding arguendo the admissibility of the defense of necessity, as a matter of law, it 
is clearly not here admissible to result in acquittal of all defendants in the light of the finding of 
the majority as to Farben's initiative at Auschwitz. All defendants who were members of 
Vorstand should share in the responsibility for the exercise of such initiative. The majority 
concedes such initiative to have existed at Auschwitz, as it was planned from the inception of 
the Farben Auschwitz Buna plant to use concentration camp labor on the project. I consider it 
unreasonable to conclude that these plans were not known by all Vorstand members. The 
majority opinion recognizes that Duerrfeld, Ambros, Krauch, ter Meer, and Buetefisch must 
bear responsibility for taking the initiative in the unlawful employment of forced workers at 
Auschwitz and that they, to some extent at least, must share the responsibility for the 
mistreatment of the workers with the SS and the construction contractors. The criminal 
responsibility so found should embrace all Vorstand members for the occurrences at 
Auschwitz. With regard to the numerous other plants in which slave labor was employed by 
Farbenm [Farben] no substantial factual distinction exists from that prevailing at Auschwitz, in 
the matter of Farben's cooperative attitude. 
 As to the employment of forced workers at Auschwitz after the Sauckel program 
of forced labor became effective, the majority opinion states: 
"The defendants contend that, the recruitment of labor being under direct control of the 
 
Reich, they did not know the conditions under which the recruitment took place, and 
 
since the foreign workers at first were procured on a voluntary basis, the defendants 
were unaware later that the method had been changed and that many of the sequent 
workers had been procured through a system of forced labor recruitment. This 
contention cannot be successfully maintained. The labor for Auschwitz was procured 
through the Reich Labor Office at Farben's request. Forced labor was used for a period 
of approximately three years, from 1942 until the end of the war. It is clear that Farben 
did not prefer either the employment of concentration-camp workers of those foreign 
nationals who had been compelled against their will to enter German labor service. On 
the other hand, it is equally evident that Farben accepted the situation that was presented 
to it through the Labor Office of the Reich and that when free workers, either German 
or foreigners, were unobtainable they sought the employment and utilization of people 
who came to them through the services of the concentration camp Auschwitz and 
Sauckel's forced-labor program." 
The foregoing analysis of the responsibility for utilization of forced labor at Auschwitz 
is equally applicable to slave labor utilization at the other Farben plants where the situation 
identical in fact. Willing cooperation with the slave labor utilization of the Third Reich was a 
matter of corporate policy that permeated the  whole Farben organization. The Vorstand was 
responsible for the policy. For this reason, criminal responsibility goes beyond the actual 
immediate participants at Auschwitz. It includes other Farben Vorstand plant-managers and 
embraces all who knowingly participated in the shaping of the corporate policy. I find on the 
evidence that all Vorstand members must share the responsibility for the approval of the policy 
despite the fact that there were varying degrees of immediate connection among various 
defendants. The "freedom and opportunity for initiative" found to exist at Auschwitz was, in 
my opinion, eually [equally] present at the other plants. I find it hard to understand why the 
majority can conclude that construction and production at Auschwitz was not under Reich 
compulsion when the Reich wanted the plant for war production and directed its erection, and 
production involving utilization of slave labor in other plants was "under compulsion." The 
 answer, it seems to me, les in fact that the freedom was as real in all the Farben plants and the 
similar attitude of willing cooperation was present – differing at Auschwitz only in the matter 
of degree. The majority opinion concludes that the defendant Krauch was a willing participant 
in the crime of enslavement. With that conclusion I agree, but the mere fact that Krauch was a 
governmental official operating at a high policy level is insufficient, in my opinion, to 
distinguish his willing participation is the crime of enslavement from other degrees of willing 
participation exhibited by the other defendants according to their respective roles within 
Farben. 
Criminal liability is not to be imputed to the officer of a corporation merely by virtue of 
his occupancy of his office. Generally a corporate officer is not criminally liable for the 
corporate acts performed by other agents or officers of a corporation. But the action of an 
officer of a corporation may result in criminal liability where, by virtue of the officer's 
individual act, by may be said to have authorized, ordered, abetted or otherwise has actually 
participated in a course of action which is criminal in character. The criminal intent required 
as a pre-requisite to guilt under the charges of war crimes, and crimes against humanity 
alleged in Count Three of the instant indictment is present if the corporate officer knowingly 
authorizes the corporate participation in action of a criminal character. On this score the 
evidence is more than sufficient. From the time of the participation by Farben in Auschwitz 
project, the corporation was actively engaged in continuing criminal offences which 
constituted participation in war crimes and crimes against humanity on a broad scale and 
under circumstances such as to make it impossible for the corporate officers not to know the 
character of the activities being carried on by Farben at Auschwitz. From the outset of the 
project it was known that slave labor including use of concentration camp inmates would be a 
principal source of the labor supply for the project. Utilization of such labor was approved as a 
matter of corporate policy. To permit the corporate instrumentality to be as a cloak to insulate 
the principle corporate officers who approved and authorized this course of action from any 
criminal responsibility which, in my opinion, is without any sound precedent under the most 
elementary concepts of criminal law. It represents a doctrime [doctrine] which should not be 
permitted to gain a foothold in the application of criminal sanctions to the acts of individuals 
who are charged with such serious infractions of international penal law. The law does not 
require the degree of personal participations in the execution of cromes [crimes] against 
 international law that I understand the majority opinion to require. It matters not that, under 
the division of labor employed by I.G. Farben, supervision of the Auschwitz project fell in the 
sphere of immediate activity of certain of the defendants, i.e., ter Meer, Ambros, Buetefisch, 
and Duerrfeld. In my view, the Auschwitz project would not have been carried out had it not 
have been authorized and approved by the other defendants who participated in the corporate 
approval of the project knowing that the concentration camp inmates and other slave labor 
would be employed in the construction and other work. We do not have in this case situation 
of complete delegation of authority to subordinate without knowledge of the criminal 
character of the action to be undertaken by those granting the authority for corporate action. 
We do not have the situation of subordinates committing offences against criminal law 
on their own initiative without the knowledge of the corporate officers. Decisions in Anglo- 
American law which decline to impose a vicarious criminal liability in such situation are not, 
therefore, strictly in point. There is, however, respectable authority for the imposition of 
criminal responsibility where the defendant was in a position to know and should have not of 
the illegal action carried out by a corporation through an agent. An analogy in Anglo-American 
law may be found in decisions dealing with the employment of child labor. For example, in the 
case of Overland Cotton Mill Co. et al v. People. 32 Colorado 263, 75 Pac. 924 (1904) the 
conviction of an assistant plant superintendent for violation of the child labor laws was 
sustained by the court despite the fact that he was not shown to have personally participated in 
the hiring of the minor. In discussing the liability of this officer, the court said: 
"…An agent of a corporation is presumed to have that knowledge of its affairs 
particularly under his control and management which, by the exercise of due 
diligence, he would have ascertained…He (the assistant superintendent) was engaged 
at the mill, and, in the performance of his duties, had the authority to hire and 
discharge employees. It thus appears from the testimony that by reason of his 
relationships to the company, and the performance of his duties he either knew, or, by 
the exercise of due diligence upon his part, should have know, that a minor under the 
prohibited age was in the employ of the company. For this reason he must be held as 
having violated the relationship he bore to the company, to have prevented the 
employment. An officer of a corporation, through whose act the corporation commits 
an offence against the laws of the state, in himself also guilty on the same offence." 
 In this case offenses against international law (to which the defense of necessity in not 
applicable) were committed by Farben, the corporate instrumentality through which the 
individual defendants acted in consummating such criminal acts. The defendants who were 
members of the Vorstand of Farben and who were plant managers certainly knew of and were 
active participants in the slave labor utilization. At the very least, they took a consenting part in 
war crimes and crimes against humanity as defined in Control Council Law No. 10. These 
plant managers not only knew of the action but they participated in executing and formulating 
the policies within Farben under which such action was taken. There is no sound reason, under 
the evidence, to render a judgment of exculpation in the case of the defendants who were plant 
managers at Farben plants employing slave labor. The other defendants who were not plant 
managers but were members of the Vorstand were likewise apprised of and took a consenting 
part in approving and directing the policies under which Farben participated in the slave labor 
program on such a broad scale. They, too, should be held criminally liable. Essentially, we 
have action by corporate board, participated in by its members, authorizing the violation of 
international law by other subordinate agents of the corporation. 
Under the evidence presented there can be no doubt that the Farben Vorstand was 
responsible for general employment policies as well as the welfare of its workers. This 
responsibility was recognized in the Law Regulating National Labor and by the action of the 
Vorstand of Farben taken under the law to discharge its responsibilities in this regard. The 
appointment of the defendant Schneider at the Main Plant Leader of Farben was pursuant to 
this responsibility of the Vorstand and was in conformity with the mentioned law. Schneider 
frequently reported to members of the Vorstand and its committiies [comities] on the matter of 
labor policy. 
The evidence shows Farben's willing cooperation in the utilization of forced foreign 
workers, prisoners of war and concentration camp inmates as a matter of conscious corporate 
policy. For example, in a report made by the defendant Schmitz, as Chairman of the Vorstand, 
to the Augsichtsrat (Supervisory Board) on 11 July 1941, Schmitz stated: 
"The factories have to make all efforts to get the necessary workers; byt [by] 
utilizing foreign workers and prisoners of war the demand could be generally met." 
This report was after the 1939 German decree introducing labor in Poland. The evidence 
shows that Farben took the initiative to obtain Polish workers and that such workers were 
 actually employed as early as 1940. in the light of the historical facts establishing the 
compulsory nature of the slave labor program of Nazi Germany, it is impossible to avoid the 
conclusion that the Polish workers included large numbers of enslaved persons. It is further 
certain that of the voluntary foreign workers originally employed many were later prohibited 
from leaving their employment had they chosen to do so. This also constituted enslavement. 
The subsequent retention of such workers in a state of servitude constituted war crimes and 
crimes against humanity in violation of Control Council Law No. 10. 
Farben's willing cooperation with the slave labor program continued even after its 
inhumane character became more evident with the appointment of Sauckel as Plenipotentiary 
General for the Utilization of Labor. On 30 May 1942, the defendant Schmitz again reported to 
the Aufsichtsrat that the lack of workers had to be compensated by the employment of 
foreigners and prisoners of war. A credible witness, Struss, stated that practically everubody 
[everybody] in Germany knew that Russian workers were forced to come to Germany after the 
battle of Kiev. The members of Farben's Vorstand, therefore, necessary knew that such forced 
workers were being employed by Farben and they approved and cooperated in the execution of 
such a labor policy. It is highly unrealistic to say, as important as labor procurement was to the 
vital matter of German war production, that persons occupying the positions of influence and 
responsibility of a Vorstand member of Farben were not well informed concerning the policies 
of the compulsory labor program in which Farben participated on such a large scale. It is not 
necessary for the evidence to establish that each defendant was informed of all the details of 
each major instance of such employment and personally exercised initiative. There is an 
abundance of evidence from which knowledge of the widespread participation by Farben as a 
matter of official corporate policy, sanctioned and approved by the individual Vorstand 
members, is conclusively to be inferred. For example, the Vorstand and its subsidiary 
committees had to approve the allocation of funds for the housing of compulsory workers. This 
meant that members of the Vorstand had to know the extend of Farben's willing cooperation in 
participating in the slave labor program and had to take an individual part in furthering the 
program. 
As to the Auschwitz Buna plant, the evidence conclusively establishes that Farben 
took the initiative in the selection of the Auschwitz site and that an important factor, if not the 
decisive one, was the knowledge of availability of concentration camp inmates of work in the 
 construction of the plant. As pointed out by the majority opinion, it was contemplated from 
the start that concentration camp labor would be used in such work. But, in my view, the 
individual liability for the carrying out of such plans goes further than the individual acts and 
actions of Krauch, Ambros, ter Meer, Buetefisch and Duerrfeld. In discussing the criminal 
responsibility of the defendant ter Meer, the Tribunal quite properly asserts that it would be 
unreasonable to conclude that conferences between the defendant Ambros and ter Meer did 
not include discussions of the all-important question of labor supply for the construction of 
the Auschwitz Buna plant and that it was consequently know to ter Meer that officials in 
charge of the Auschwitz plant construction were taking the initiative in planning for and 
availing themselves of the use of concentration-camp labor. With this conclusion, I agree but, 
in my opinion, it is similarly unreasonable to conclude that the reports to the Vorstand on the 
Auschwitz project ignored these matters. Just as ter Meer was superior of Ambros, the 
Vorstand was the superior of both and there is no reason to conclude that the knowledge 
possessed by Ambros and ter Meer was not fully reported to and discussed in the Vorstand. 
There is, indeed, strong positive evidence that this was done and that it must have been done 
is a proper influence of fact to be drawn from the very nature of the serious responsibility 
being undertaken by Farben in becoming involved in the slave labor utilization to the extent 
that it did at Auschwitz. 
The defendant Gajewski, Hoerlein, Buergin, Jahne, Kuehne, Lautenschlaeger, 
Schneider and Wurster, in their capacities as plant leaders or managers of one or more of the 
important plants of Farben and as members of the Technical Committee participated in the 
utilization of slave labor, in plants under their jurisdiction, and actively participated in 
furthering the policy of slave labor utilization within the Farben enterprises. They should all 
the held guilty under Count Three of the indictment. 
Although the dutires [duties] of the defendant Schmitz, von Schnitzler, von Knieriem, 
Haeflinger, Ilgner, Mann and Oster were not directly related to the management of any 
specific plant or project in which slave labor was employed, they did know of the policy 
throughout the Farben organization. As members of the Vorstand, they tacitly approved such 
policy. In my view, it is not necessary for them as individuals personally to take the initiative 
in procurement or allocation of such labor. It suffices that they knowingly approved of the 
policy of slave labor utilization and that is, I conclude, abundantly established by the record. 
 A construction project of the magnitude of Auschwitz could not have been 
initiated unless adequate reports were made to the Vorstand on the more important 
factors which influence the selection of an industrial site including the sources of and 
availability of labor. I am convinced that Krauch spoke the truth in his pre-trial affidavit 
when he stated that Farben could agree to or refuse to erect the Buna plant at Auschwitz; 
that the site was selected by Ambros and report was made to the Farben Vorstand of the 
factors considered, including labor; and that the members of the Executive Board of 
Farben (Vorstand) "were informed of the employment of concentration camp inmates 
with the I.G. Buna plant at Auschwitz and did not protest." In other words, there can be 
no doubt that the Farben Vorstand approved the policy of employing concentration camp 
inmates in the erection of the Auschwitz Buna plant and did not object as it was their 
duty to do. 
This, in my opinion, constitutes affirmative action of approval by the members of the 
Vorstand and leads inescapably to their criminal complicity within the degree of participation 
required by Control Council Law No. 10, as constituting taking a consenting part in the action. 
I cannot agree with the majority that it is necessary for the evidence to show an abnormal 
degree of initiative on the part of each defendant in seeking such labor or in participating in 
negotiations to obtain it. These are matters far bellow the policy level at which many of the 
defendants operated. But it suffices that they knew the policy and tacitly approved. Certain of 
the defendants were more intimately concerned with the execution of the project than others, 
but that does not, in any sense, detract from the complicity of the other corporate officials, 
sitting on the governing boar or Vorstand of Farben, and who are shown by the evidence to 
have know what was in progress and who gave their consent thereto by their inaction and 
acquiescence and by not objecting. Corroborating evidence is found in the pre-trial affidavits 
of defendants Buetefisch and Schneider. Furthermore, members of the Technical Committee 
(TEA), including defendants ter Meer, Schneider, Buetefisch, Ambros, Lautenschlaeger, 
Jaehne, Hoerlein, Kuehne, Buergin, Gajewski, and von Knieriem (as guest) participated in 
meetings at which reports were made on the Auschwitz project and huge appropriations were 
made for the work. It taxes credulity to say that these important corporate officials were not 
informed in a general way of the major developments in the all-important matter of labor 
procurement. I conclude, form the evidence, that they were bound to know, as a pre-requisits 
 to the proper discharge of their duties, of such a major development as the Goering Order of 
18 February 1941, issued at the request of the defendant Krauch and addressed to 
Reichsfuehrer SS. Himmler directed directing that concentration camp inmates be made 
available for the construction of the Buna plant at Auschwitz. There is, in my opinion, 
absolutely no merit to the defense that the defendants were "forced" to use concentration camp 
inmates, or that they were ignorant of Farben's plans being executed at Auschwitz. 
The true attitude of Farben and the flimsy character of the defense of coercion and 
necessity asserted by the defendants is best illustrated by defendant Krauch's letter to 
Himmler written in July 1943 wherein Krauch write that he was 
"particularly pleased to hear that during this discussion you hinted that you may 
possibly aid the expansion of another synthetic factory…in a similar way as was done at 
Auschwitz by making available inmates of your camps, if necessary. I have also written 
to Minister Speer to this effect and would be grateful if you would continue sponsoring 
and aiding us in this matter." 
I conclude that all members of the Vorstand viewed the availability of such labor and its 
subsequent employment at Auschwitz as an "assistance" to Farben and all defendants must 
share in the responsibility for its utilization. The evidence established that consistent procedures 
for dissemination of information among key Farben personnel were regularly followed as a 
matter of policy. It is certain that, through this medium, at the very minimum, knowledge came 
to the more important Farben officials of the extent of Farben's participation in the slave labor 
utilization at Auschwitz. The increase in inmates at Auschwitz from seven hundred in 1941 to 
more than seven thousand by the end of 1943 could nor have been unknown to the defendants 
who were members of Farben's Vorstand. 
Having accepted a large scale participation in the utilization of concentration camp 
inmates at Auschwitz, and, acting through certain of its agents, having exercised initiative in 
negotiating with the SS to obtain more and more workers, Farben became inevitably connected 
with the inhumanity involved in the utilization of such labor. This majority opinion, in effect, 
by recognizing the defense of necessity, implies that if defendants in the operation of the slave 
labor program did no more that the cruel and inhuman regulations prescribed, those 
participating in the utilization of labor under such condition of servitude are not responsible 
therefore. I cannot agree. The evidence establishes that the conditions at Auschwitz were 
 inhumane in an extreme degree. It is no overstatement, as the prosecution asserts, to calculate 
that the working conditions indirectly resulted in the deaths of thousands of human beings. 
These defendants may not, themselves, have subjectively willed the deaths of the unfortunate 
victims, who were subsequently exterminated by the SS in the gas chambers, but their part in 
the utilization of the inmates under such conditions was a link of the entire hideous criminal 
enterprise and I cannot minimize in the slightest degree the heavy responsibility which Farben 
and its responsible concentration camp, Monowitz, in 1942. Funds for this purpose were 
appropriated by the TEA and the Vorstand after consideration the need – showing again the 
widespread knowledge within Farben of the extent of utilization of the concentration comp 
inmates. 
The extreme cold, the inadequacy of the food, the rigorous nature of the work, the cruel 
treatment of the workers by their supervisors, combine to present a picture of horror which, I 
am convinced, has not been at all overdrawn by the prosecution and which is fully sustained by 
the evidence. The living and working conditions were in truth unendurable and, as these 
inmates were engaged in Farben's business, it was the responsibility of Farben to correct the 
situation. Such efforts at amelioration of conditions as were attempted to be shown, fall short 
of any adequate effort to meet the real responsibility imposed on Farben in this regard. It must 
be borne in mind that these men were misused as slaves by Farben, through Farben's own 
initiative and out of Farben's desire to utilize them as means of furthering the building of a 
plant whose immediate purpose was to be war production but was to be iftted [fitted] into the 
longe [long]- range plans of Farben's domination of the eastern economic area. Consequently, 
in view of the degree of the initiative, the duty to the workers must be regarded as a higher dity 
[duty]. Farben's efforts fall far short of the requirement. 
Among the credible witnesses whose testimony was offered to the Tribunal were a 
number of British prisoners of war who described the pitiable lot of the inmates working on the 
Farben site at Auschwitz. There was highly credible evidence from these eye-witnesses to 
established – that the inmates were skinny and not physically fit for the work they were forced 
to do; that their appearance was such as to make it hard to believe that they were human beings; 
that they all suffered from malnutrition; that the so-called "buna soup" was thin and watery and 
 inadequate; that the inmates were being starved to death. I am convinced from this evidence that 
Farben did not discharge the high responsibility imposed upon it in the matter of seeing that its 
 compulsory workers were adequately fed, and responsibility for this situation cannot be shifted 
by the defendants to the SS and the Farben sub-contractors. 
The evidence further establishes conclusively that the working conditions on the 
Farben construction site at Auschwitz were inhuman. The miserable inmates were forced to 
work beyond their physical capacities. They were subjected to rigorous discipline in the 
performance of work assignments and there was a direct relationship between the 
requirements set by Farben and the ill-treatment accorded the inmates by the SS. The son of 
the defendant Jaehne has testified: 
"Of all the people employed in I.G. Auschwitz, the inmates received the worse 
treatment. They were beaten by the capos, who in their turn had to see to it that the 
amount of work prescribed them and their detachments by the I.G. foreman was carried 
out, because otherwise they were punished by being beaten in the evening in the 
Monowitz Camp. A general driving system prevailed in the I.G. construction site, so 
that one cannot say that the capos alone were to blame. The capos drove the inmates in 
their detachments exceedingly hard, in self-defense, so to speak, and did not shrink 
from using any means of increasing the work of the inmates, just so long as the amount 
of work required was done." 
I am convinced that this is a true description of what actually happened at Auschwitz 
and from the vast amount of credible evidence introduced before the Tribunal I am further 
convinced that it was true, as contended by the prosecution, that is was Farben's drive for speed 
in theconstruction on at Auschwitz which resulted indirectly in thousands of the inmates being  
selected for extermination by the SS when they were rendered unfit for work. The proof 
establishes that fear of expermination [extermination] was used to spur the inmates to greater 
efforts and that they undertook tasks beyond their physical strength as a result of such fear. It is 
also clear from the proof that injured or ill inmates frequently refrained from seeking medical 
treatment out of fear of being sent for extermination to the gas chambers at Birkenau.  
The defendants, members of the Vorstand, cannot, in my opinion, avoid sharing a large 
part of the guilt for these numberless crimes against humanity. The condition of the inmates 
being worked by Farben could not have been unknown to the principal corporate officials. The 
truth of the matter is related by the witness Frost, a British prisoner of war: 
"In addition to the I.G. foreman and other officials at Auschwitz, every once in a while 
 big shots from the main firm would come down to the plant. In my opinion nobody 
who worked at the plant or who came into the plant on business or inspections could 
avoid discovering the facts that the inmates were literally being worked to death. They 
had no color in their faces whatsoever. They were practically living corpses covered 
with skin and bones and completely broken in spirit. Everyone who was there knew 
that inmates were kept there as long as they turned out work and that when they were 
physically unable to continue, they were disposed of." 
In summary, it is established that Farben selected the Auschwitz site with knowledge of 
the existence of the concentration camp and contemplated the use of concentration camp 
inmates in its construction; that these matters necessary had to be reported to and discussed by 
the Vorstand and the TEA; that Farben initiative obtained the inmates for work at Auschwitz; 
that the project was constantly before the members of the TEA for necessary appropriation of 
funds; that the TEA had to have information on the labor aspect of the project to properly 
perform its functions; that the condition of the concentration camp inmates was brought to the 
attention of the TEA and Vorstand members in various discussions and reports; that a number 
of the defendants were actually eye witnesses to conditions at Auschwitz because of personal 
visits to Auschwitz; that the defendants Krauch, von Knieriem, Schneider, Jaehne, Ambros, 
Buetefisch, and ter Meer were all shown to have visited the I.G. Auschwitz site during 
occurrences of the nature generally described above; that the conditions at Auschwitz were so 
horrible that it is utterly incredible to conclude that they were unknown to the defendants, the 
principal corporate directors, who were responsible for Farben's connection with the project. 
A letter written by a Farben employee at I.G. Auschwitz to a Farben employee at 
Frankfurt on 30 July 1942 describes the enterprise in which these defendants must be 
considered a consenting part as follows: 
"…You can imagine that the population is not going to behave in a friendly or even 
correct manner toward the Reich Germans, especially towards us I.G. people. The only 
thing that keeps these filthy people from becoming rebellious is the fact that armed 
power (the concentration camp) is in the background. The evil glances which are 
occasionally cast at us are not punishable. Apart from these facts, however, we are quite 
happy here…… 
"With a staff of such size, you can well imagine that the number of accommodation 
 barracks is constantly increasing and that large city of shacks has developed. In 
addition to that, there is the circumstance that some 1,000 foreign workers see to it 
that our food supply does not deteriorate. Thus we find Italians, Frenchmen, Croats, 
Belgians, Poles, and, as the ‘closest collaborators' the so-called criminal prisoners of 
all shades. That the Jewish race is playing a special part here you can well imagine. 
The diet and treatment of this sort or people is in accordance with our aim. Evidently, 
an increase in weight is hardly ever recorded for them. That bullets start whizzing at 
the slightest attempt of a‘change of air' is also certain as well as the fact that many 
have already disappeared as a result of a ‘sunstroke.'" 
It is contended by the defense that the construction of the Farben concentration camp 
Monowitz was to improve the living standards of concentration camp inmates who formerly 
lived in the Auschwitz concentration camp. Such contention is refuted by contemporaneous 
documents which establish that far from any such humanitarian motive the true motive was to 
obtain the labor which had been interrupted due to the typhus epidemic of 1942. The 
defendant Krauch admitted that Ambros and Buetefisch "proposed to the executive board of 
the I.G. to erect the concentration camp Monowitz within the I.G. territory Auschwitz for 
reasons of expediency." I am convinced from the proof that the purpose in erecting the camp 
was to obtain the concentration camp labor and to make it more productive by eliminating the 
transportation to and from the main concentration camp. The food system, also pointed to by 
the defense, was introduced to increase the output of the workers and was administered with 
this as a predominant consideration. Moreover, it did not actually improve the miserable lot of 
majority workers. It is never a defense in criminal case to point to instances in which criminal 
action is not involved. The evidence does not convince me of any serious efforts by Farben to 
remedy the food situation at Auschwitz and I am unable to find evidence of a mitigating 
nature in this regard. 
We have in this case the absurd contention urged that the fence around the premises 
of the Farben plant was erected, not for the purpose of making the servitude of the workers 
more secure, but for the purpose of giving the inmates more freedom and keeping the SS out 
of the premises. Here, again, the contemporary documents establish that the purpose of the 
construction of the fence was to meet suggestions of the SS that this be done to make 
possible assignment of more inmates under conditions requiring fewer guards. 
 The overwhelming weight of the evidence it to the effect that the living conditions in 
Farben's camp Monowitz added greatly to the misery of the workers. The quarters were 
overcrowded, the water, toilet, and other sanitary facilities were inadequate. The devastating 
effect of the cold weather upon the under-nourished and underclothed inmates has, in my 
opinion, been established by overwhelming credible proof. The attempt of Farben to 
ameliorate this situation by providing winter coats in 1944 shortly before the evacuation of 
Auschwitz can hardly be said to operate as exculpation for the misery and mistreatment as 
related in the statements on numerous eye witnesses to these conditions. The defense has 
introduced voluminous documents, affidavits, and some testimony in an attempt to controvert 
the overwhelming weight of the prosecution's evidence. I do not consider that this evidence 
presented by the defense is sufficiently credible to raise a reasonable doubt on the subject of 
mistreatment. 
The contemporaneous documents introduces by the defense fall far short of 
detracting from the prosecution's proof. On cross-examination by the prosecution, in a 
sampling process, the defense affiants who were leading employees of Farben at the 
Auschwitz site made numerous damaging admissions seriously detracting from the weight 
and credibility of the previous testimony given in their affidavits. Defense affiants who were 
called for cross-examination by the prosecution fell into three categories – those from whom 
testimony corroborating the damaging evidence of the prosecution was obtained on cross-
examination; those whose credibility was completely destroyed on cross-examination; and 
those affidavits were withdrawn by the defense, in some instances, even after appearance at 
Nurnberg. I conclude that very little weight, is to be attached to the affidavits introduced by 
the defense. Unless we are to resort to weighing the evidence by the bulk number of 
affidavits, the prosecution has established Farben's participation in the mistreatment of the 
concentration camp inmates at Auschwitz in an aggravated degree. At the very minimum it 
was the responsibility of defendants Schneider and the members of the Vorstand shown to 
have visited Auschwitz to have succeeded in correcting these conditions. This,  
these defendants did not do, and they should be held criminally responsible for these 
aggravations of the crime of enslavement, in addition to their responsibility for participation 
in the utilization of slave labor. 
No useful purpose would be served in an analysis of the evidence in detail as applied to 
 each individual defendant. The guilt varies in degree with each defendant and his functions in 
Farben must be considered. It is untenable, however, in my opinion, to say that Schmitz, the 
Chairman of Farben's Vorstand, bears none of the responsibility for Farben's participation in 
the slave labor program, including occurrences at Auschwitz, or that Schneider, Farben's Main 
Plant Leader in the labor field in not responsible. International law cannot possibly be 
considered as operating in a complete vacuum of legal irresponsibility – in which crime on 
such a broad scale can be actively participated in by a corporation exercising the power and 
influence of Farben without those who are responsible for participating in the policies being 
liable therefore. What is true of Schmitz, Chairman of the Boars, is true of the other managers 
of Farben in variety degrees. 
Auschwitz has been chosen in this summation as it is the most aggravated of Farben's 
many participations in the slave labor program. In such treatment of the evidence, it must be 
noted that the various defendants who were plant managers were, in most instances, also 
actively participants in the utilization of slave labor in plants under their jurisdiction, and in 
instances in which this was not the case the defendants knew of, acquiesced in, and were 
consequently responsible for the Farben policy involved in such utilization. To review the 
evidence in detail as to each defendant, or as to each Plant Manager, in this opinion, would 
lengthen the opinion beyond any reasonable bounds. With respect to the Western workers 
employed in Farben plants, mitigating circumstances have been shown in regard to the 
treatment of some of these workers. It suffices, therefore, to conclude this separate expression 
of views by merely stating that I am of the opinion that each defendant who is a member of the 
Vorstand should be held guilty under Count Three of the Indictment and that I disagree with 
the majority in the acquittal of defendants Schmitz, von Schnitzler, Gajewski, Hoerlein, von 
Knieriem, Schneider, Buergin, Haeflinger, Ilgner, Jaehne, Kuehne, Lautenschlaeger, Mann, 
Oster, and Wurster. These defendants are, in my opinion, guilty subject to such individual 
consideration of mitigating circumstances as should be considered in fixing their punishment. 
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